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In this lecture I want to argue for a satisfying approach to moral phi-
losophy which has consequences for the two other matters on my 
agenda: religion on the otw hand, ancl liberalism on the other. This 
may s<~<·m surprising. The approach which I shall recommend lies 
squan·ly in 'nwta-t'thics' -the theory of ethics, and its relationship to 
things like truth and reason and o~jecthity.lt is not clear what the route 
can be from theories in that area to more first-order or practical mat-
ters. It might seem that you could hm·e any of a variety of theories about 
what human ethkalthought actually consists in, yet he yom·self hot or 
cold, opinionated or not, in pursuit of whichever practical code or ethics 
or politics appeals to you. To put it bluntly, you could n·ad much of 
my writing without knowing which party I vote ((n·. 
Howe,·cr, although the connections may not be clear, it is surdy 
evident that human beings generally do leel that there is such a route. 
Positions like sul~jt•ctivism and relativism, or nihilism or sn•pticism may 
be tlworetical positions about the status of some discourse or another, 
but they arc certainly felt to have first-ordet· impact. Most obviously, 
there is the feeling that they destroy confidenn·. and sometimes this 
is their amwed intent. Perhaps they clo not imply that you would \'nte 
one way or the other, but they may imply that you arc less likely to vol<' 
at all. Postmod<.·rn celebrations of rd;ttivism such as that popularly as-
sociat<.•cl with Richard Rorty (who tl<.'\'<.'rtheh.•ss repudiates the label) 
couns<.•lus to remember that all our vocabulari<.•s are provisional and 
situated, historically conditimlt'rl, anrl ine\·itahly due for subduction 
beneath others as tlw plat<·s ofhmnan thought shift in response to new 
human purposes and problems. This is supposed to hcget 'lib<.•ral 
irony'. which, whatever else it might <.'tljnin, is dl•arly something less 
than t·om·iction, something unselfconfident, appropriat<~ to a mode 
of thought that half sees itself as due to be debunked or undermined. 
When people draw in their breath and excoriate its absurdities, it 
is often forgotten how much modem philosophy of the most sober kind 
nevertheless flows the way of post modernism. Once, perhaps there were 
autho•·itative obse1vations, and uniquely rational ways of synthesizing, 
testing, and eventually accepting theories on their hasis. There were 
rules of reason, applying not only in science but equally in practical 
affairs. All we had to do was display those rules, and the human ani-
mal would fall into epistemological line, pointing at the true, and 
avoiding the false. But ifthere ever was such confidence, the late twen-
tieth century could not rediscover it. Sellars and Quine stressed the 
dinicuhies, and even the cultural relativity, in the process of ohser\'a-
tion. Goodman and Hempel, not to mention the e\·enmal failure of 
Carnap's continuation theory as a program, destroyed any confidence 
that there would he one right way of taking observation, even if we were 
more confident in it. Popper and a following generation of philoso-
phers of science such as Kuhn and Feyerabcncl, su·esscd the provisional 
and insecure nature of any acceptance of scientific thcury. 
Wiugcnstcin and Quine made il worse, undermining the ratio-
nality of classification itself, seeing the application and reapplication 
of words to things more as an exercise of subjectivity than a response 
to anything o~jectivcly given. All these tendencies suggest that we no 
longer maintain a sense of the twlltoril)'ofany norms to which we con-
form or which we demmtd from others. Instead of seeing such authmity, 
we see tlmwglt it. The way is cleared for a plurality of competing 'nar-
ratives', none commanding assent, but all, somehow, commanding 
e£)ual 'respect'. This might sound liberal, but I would deny that it is. 
The•·e is a grave question about whether that respect can be more than 
a sham, given that the respect we would really like for an opinion or 
belief is that it is I me. But the notion of I milt is one of those that has 
been deconstructed, made ironic. Nobody but a metaphysical prig be-
lieves in truth anr more. Respect therefme becomes something pal-
lid, and eventually demeaning: the respect of toleration, of the 
passive-aggressive sneer 'whatever', or the kind of provocative lilke re-
spect parents give to their childrens' music: put up with il, but that is 
all. 
If this has been our situation in theorising about the norms that 
are to govern sober science, it has heen much worse in thin king about 
other areas, such as ethics. 
Obviously, when postmodernism is the premiling \\;net, there is 
going to he a reaction. Philosophically, I think we should distinguish 
two classes of reaction. One, most appropriate to science, is just the 
brutal reminder that it works, and that you rely on it all the time. Pop-
per may have thought that the scientific assertion that arsenic poisons 
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is hut a hold cm~jcctun·, lik<· tlw cot~j<•ctun· that an asteroid will de-
stroy lilc on earth within fi~·c hundn·d years. But he would not have 
IJl'cn tn·ating it as a mere rm~jcctmc as he snatched the arsenic from 
a child's hands, or refi.tSl·d th<· wa into which it hacl been poured. Con-
linnation and falsification determine practice. Philosophers may worry 
about t'<•ason and truth, but they know where utilily lies, just like the 
rest of us. This is pragmatism, and it has much to he said f(n· it. 
But tlw other reaction is more ambitious. It wonics thai pragmalism 
docs not, in Bcmard Williams' phras<·. gi\'<' truth a life of its own. To 
1hc pragmatist, f(n· t•xampk•, it mak<·s no difference whctlll'r a scien-
tific theory is litl'rally true, or wh<·th<·r it is a useful ficlion, so thatna-
lllrc gi\'l'S us obscr\'ations and n·wards us f()r practising as if iL is true. 
Many peopk Wl'l'l' shock<·d by Willi;un James's original presentation 
of pragmalisrn, since it s<·emcdlo elide the difference between a re-
ligious bdit•f being lme, and it being expedient to bclie\'e it. There 
is in us a desire not just for utility hut for understanding. So the more 
ambitious rt•action, and the particular bel<' noire of pragm:uisls, is to 
pro\'ide a wcty off(•eding lhis desire. It is notjustthal some of our opin-
ions enable us to cop<·, hut th:H they do so by rcprcseming the world 
properly. Authority, ancltmth, arc to he n·storecl in themsch·cs, and 
iL is only when th<·y arc that om basic self-confidence is reco\'cred. 
Against this background I should now like to say something about 
mym\11 \it•w ofethics.lt has three building blocks. Fit'Sl,l sec our propen-
sity fi)r norms of thought and conduct in practical terms. We talk of 
duties, obligations, rights, and \'alut•s in order to orientate ourseh·es 
towards conduct. This is what this talk (including talk to ourselves in 
seii:Conscious rdl<·<·tion, or to others in discourse) is for, and withont 
their lift· in human, sclf~nmscious and self~reflccth·c agents, thecate-
gories we me as we go in f(u· it arc nothing. 
I work this out hy accepting a distinction first made promincm 
by Elizabeth Ansnnnht•. Some states of mincl arc representational. They 
purport to represent how the world is. Others are not: their point is 
to oriental<~ oursel\'cs to the world as we take it to be in order to act 
upon it. The paradigm oft he first kind of state is a belief, and of the 
second a cl<·sirc or an intention. Anscmnhe illustrated the diflcrcncc 
with the example of a shopping list. Normally a shopping list is used 
to steer your sdections: tlw point is to get the shopping hag to con-
form to the shopping list. Uut a clett•ctive or a sociologist might fol-
low you round making a list of what is in your hag. His list a 
repr<•sentalinn. It is rt•sponsh•c to the contents of your hag. The sec-
om! building block of mr \'icw is that ethics is to he explained in terms 
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of the practical kind of mental state, the one with the world to word 
direction of fit. 
One might think that if that is so, it is a pity that ethics mimics other 
sciences: we talk of moral remarks as u·ue or f~llsc, we talk of mm<tl knowl-
edge, and so on. Shouldn't we regret all that, once the practical na-
ture of morals is impressed upon us? Some moral thinkers have 
famously supposed so. They think that in an honest language, as it we•·e, 
our practical stances would be communicated by simple prescriptions, 
like orders, or by spontaneous outbursts, like expressions ofjoy or sur-
prise. These writers are called error theorists, because, like posunod-
ernists, they sec our normal ways of thought as based on self-deception 
and error. I disagree. I see the way in which ethics gets expressed as 
perfectly in order: we have tailored the language to meet our needs 
for discussion, reflection, and inference. 
Some postmodern authors reject the Anscom be distinction. They 
rail against the VCI)' idea of 'representation', and hence the comrast 
that Anscombe draws (they can hardly deny the distinction between 
the shopper and the detective, but they can deny its applicability to 
states of mind). They return to pragmatism, asserting in Rorty's terms 
that all language is for coping, not for copying, and hence that ethics 
is no different from any other enterprise of thought. I hold that they 
arc wrong. The idea of representation, for me, is the idea of an ex-
planation of success in action. And some things explain in a way that 
duties, obligations, and the rest do not (in fact, this is why we can rely 
on Anscombe's contrast). 
Let me expand this for a moment. It is no good asserting that a 
map or a chan is for coping, not copying. A chart enables you to cope. 
certainly, bm it does so because it depicts or represents the lie of the 
land. lt is no miracle that it enables you to cope. lt docs so by being a 
depiction in which things such as rocks and headlands, and features 
such as their position, heights, and gcometric;1l rcl<llions, arc mir-
rored by isomorphic features of the map. We might say that the map 
enters into an explanatory relationship, first with the landscape and 
second with our success in coping with it. When we cope well by using 
il, we know why, and the answer lies in its representative namre. There 
is no other answer. 
Similarly once we accept a science, we accept its explanations of 
why we cope using the science. Our so coping is just one of the nat-
ural phenomena that f~dls within the scope of scientific explanation. 
Our rocket lands on the moon because our astronomical data told us 
that the moon would he at place X, and that is where it was. There is 
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nothing \'iciously circular about such an explanation. Rorty once 
wrote that 
A protgmatist in the philosophy of science cannot usc the truth 
of Galill·o's views as an explanation either of his success at 
prediction or of his graclually increasing Hunc.l 
But this is a rnludio of pragmatism. If a theory is our theory we only 
brackc.·t its truth by ignoring something which we in l~\ct accept: our 
own explanation of the phenonwna that led to the theory in the first 
place. Ami that explanation is exactly the one proviclccl by the theory 
itself. 
Tlw point is obvious applkclto common-sense rather than science 
in all its glory. Suppose I come into the room, open the door and sec 
the cat, and thereby come to hclie\'C that there is a cat there. Suppose 
someone sets nut to explain why I believe that then· is a cat there. l-Ie 
could proceed by resolutely 'hrac:kcting' the qu<•stion of whether there 
is a cat about (some sociologists of science, proponents of the so-
calll·cl Strong Program, han• saiclthat he must). He might start, for in-
stance, hehinclmy eyeballs, ami put chmn only talk of the energies hitting 
my retina. And for some purposes, in cognitivc.· science, say, this may 
have a point. If he is only intc.•restecl in the pathways lhnn •·etinal ex-
citation to hl'lief, it is inclifTercnt to him how the retinal excitation was 
caused. 
A dill'c.·rc.·nt investigator in a different context might bracket the 
question of what was there as wc.•ll. Suppose I ha,·e heen prep;u-ed for 
this occasion by being carefully briefed that the room is going to con-
tain holographic illusions of cats. If in spite of this I happily jump to 
the conclusion that it is a cat, my overconfidence seems odd and might 
require cxplamllinn, even on an occasion when I am in fact right. But 
this is an unusual context, although it could have parallels in scicncc.·. 
There could he occasions whc·n an in\'cstigator knows that there arc 
other equally likely explanations of his c\iclcncc, hut suppresses them, 
and this would require sociological explanation, even if he turned out, 
luckily, to ha\'e heen right. 
But in most contexts of explanation, truth makc.•s all the difference. 
If our investigator is not a cognitive scientist but a psychiatrist, puzzling 
himself over me as patiem, then there is all the clincrence in the worlcl 
between my tendency to bclil'\'l' that there is a cal in the room wlwn 
1 Rnrtr ..... t·minism ami Pragmati~m·. Tanner l.t"cture delin·H·d at tht· l'nin•rsity of 
:\fichigan. 1!1!10. 
there is and I have seen it, and a tendency tn hcli<·ve it when there is 
nothing that even looks like a cat, or when I have neither been in the 
room nor received any information indirectly about it. In the fi•·st case 
I am normal, and in the second prone to delusions. In the first case, 
there is nothing out of the ordinary to say, whereas in the second case 
I am a nuisance to myself and to others, and more unusual diagnoses 
and remeclks may be required. 
The ofl:.key feature of Rorty's remark (and the Strong Program) 
is that it seems to want to put Galilco, and the scientific civilization that 
followed him, into something like the second categm)'· Whe•·eas in fact, 
it is in the first . .Jupiter's four moons explained Galileo's sighting and 
his belief,just as the cat explains my more e\·e•)•day belie[ And just as 
we do not have to draw upon sinister dark social forces to explain my 
status as an announcer of cats, so we do not have to resort to clark so-
cial forces swaying Galileo and his posterity in that case either. 
Remming to Anscomhc, I deny that rights, obligations and the 
rest J~tll into the same explanatory clinch with the world and our say-
ings about it. We may be more successful by con((mning to our du-
ties to be good parents-indeed, I very much hope and believe we 
arc-but that is not becmtse we arc conforming to duty. It is because 
in doing so we treat children in a way that promotes their flourish-
ing. We could gn into more detail about what we do and why it works, 
but the general shape of the explanation keeps us awtt)' fi·om normative 
categories. 
This is why there is scope for a special kind of them)' of ethics-
expressivism, or non-representative functionalism, if we like. It ac-
knowledges the special failure, in the case of evaluative and nonnative 
discourse, of the explanatory clinch that locks together representation 
and sober empirical fact. But to repeat, it docs not regret m· lament 
either our propensity to ethics in general, or the way we express our-
selves in terms of moral propositions. It is not a rcf(mning pn~ect, but 
an interpretative one. 
Here I must confess that, having explored and promoted this gen-
eral line on ethics for some thirty years, I am still surprised how difli-
cult it is f(ll' m;my•m·iters, even or especially in the little world of moral 
theory to accept it. The rhetmic is telling: the cxpressi\'ist is billed as 
little better than a relativist or nihilist. He duesn'trcally bdie\'e in truth 
in ethics. He has no proper conception of authority. He thinks that 
duties, obligations and the rest arc fictions (e\'en the great David Lewis 
made this charge). Others talk of 'attitudinizing' or 'mere' imagina-
tion or 'mere' culture. The exprcssivist is actuallr no better than the 
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ironists and the debunkers. Only something more robust, a reali.sm about 
moral fact, will restore to us the sclf-conlidcnce we want. 
Rorty likes to com pan· this kind of hankering f(>•· a potent kind of 
authority, with the religious desire to be saved. And although I disagree 
with him about representation in general, here I helie\'e he is right. 
There is nothing wrong or inflationary about seeing the cartographer 
as responsive or n.·repti\'l' to the position of the rock. It is no more than 
common sense knowledge of how the world works. But the philoso-
plwr who finds it important to see us as responsive or ren·ptive to val-
ues or obligations is going out on a limb, beyond causation and 
common-sense understanding of how things work. He is indeed anal-
ogous to the religious bclie\'erwho supposes that he can he told or has 
been told what to think about these things by the authoritative mice 
of God. In each case, with the right state of grace, the tntth can he im-
pressed upon us, hut without that state of grace, he it a gift of culture 
or reason, grace or bildu11~, we arc lost. With it we are not rl·sponsible, 
but responsh•c. We only need to listen properly, or look clearly. How 
else arc Wl' to characterise authority, real authority, except in terms of 
external impression. the stamp of a reality outside of us? 
To use an analoh')'llladl· by the Australian philosopher Huw Price, 
it is as if Wl' approach the sul~jcct of political authority, and start with 
tlw idea of the divine .-ight of kings. If that idea subsides under us, as 
it did in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it would 
be tempting to slide to anarchism. Since authority needed dhinc right, 
and divine right has turned turtle, there is no such thing as political 
authority. A'> Price notes, this is a false dichotomy: it skips over what 
he calls tlw Republican option, whereby we create ou.- own stmcturcs 
of numtl and political authority, which arc nonetheless n~al, and le-
gitimate, l<1r all that. 
Yet it is incredibly diflicuh for people to understand this. Indeed 
I suspect that in the world at large there is little hope for people doing 
so. It is well-attested in social anthropology that communities without 
a rclihrious ideology that is common and publicly ;l\'owed survive worse 
than one with such a thing. We poor human animals sc<•m incapable 
of acknowledging oursclws <l'> the amhors of norms that are nevertheless 
binding. We find a paradox in the idea that we can be hound hy nur-
scl\'l's, and escape it only hy displacing the authorship. 
I like to illustrate the difliculty with a quotation from the late Jean 
Hampton talking of the shocking example from Gilbert Harman, in 
whkh the sul~ect comes upon some ghastly children pottring gas on 
a cat, with the intl'ntion of burning it: 
7 
either we should belie\'e that it really is true that burning cats 
is ol~jectively wrong, or else we should believe that (some but 
not all) people make such a judgment because of certain psy-
chological facts about them and the kind of society they ha\'e 
grown up in. 
I want to reply to this by asking why we should not believe both. I think 
that burning cats is ol~ectively wrong, and I also believe that some but 
not all people make this judgment because of certain psychological 
htcts-namcly, their hostile attitude to buming cats. In facti hold that 
everyone sincere makes the judgment because they share that attitude. 
Hut some people perhaps do not hold the attitude, and may dissent 
from the judgment or mouth it insincerely. I also suppose that like me 
people have that attitude in part because of the kind of society they 
have grown up in: in this case, a liberal, humane society with sufficient 
imagination and sympathy with animals to find the childrens' behav-
ior perfectly abhorrent. Also, I am proud to say, a society that on the 
whole attempts a good job of meeting its members needs, cultivating 
attitudes and sentiments that make for well-being, and is at least by 
historical standards, quite sensitive to the undoubted instances where 
we fall short. 
The fear implicit in Hampton's remark is one of competition: it 
is set up as if the explanation in terms of a moral reality is threatened 
by the explanation in terms of imagination and culture, and can only 
maintain its credentials by elbowing it out, just as an explanation in 
terms of my having seen a cat would have to compete with an alter-
native in terms of my propensity to suffer from delusions. For the anti-
realist, there is no competition and no threat. What my culture and 
upbringing have brought about is my propensity to feel horror at the 
childrens' action-and a good thing too. There is, indeed, an cle-
ment of self-congratulation in that last remark, but that is inevitable. 
The pat on the hack is no more worrying or undeserved than the sci-
entist's view that the explanation of why his instrument gave him the 
reading it did was the very fact he inferred fi·01n the reading itself. It 
just means there is no skyhook, nowhere outside the swirl ofattilllcle, 
fi·om which to judge atLitude. One must simply bring other attitudes 
to help out. 
How can I hold that the children were doing something ol~jcctivcly 
wrong? Must I not hold that the opinion is purely su~jective, or that 
we have at best a congmencc of subjectivities: just us? Not at all. The 
right way to hear the issue of ot~ectivity is in the, flrst-order, ethical 
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way. Then indeed someont· might think the opinion 'subjecti\'t" in a 
number of ways. He might think it is whimsical, dcrh·ing fi·om some-
thing \'ery specific to me. He might be imputing a hidden <tgenda of 
self~ach·antage, as we do when we hear spokesmen for tobacco com-
panies denying that smoking is hac I. He might think that a better imag-
inative unrlca·standing of cats would overturn it. He might be vaunting 
a society where cruelty is a prl'luclc to bravery in haute, and the chil-
dren need to practice it. He might clouht whether our society dest·n·es 
the little encomium I gave it above. 
But I reject all of this. I han· no temptation to admit even a hare 
possibility of a beuer point of view, from which burning cats begins 
to look tolerable, or in which mutual cruelties supplalll the operations 
of mutual sympathy and civility in nweting ourjointneeds. I have taken 
in all the f~tcts, seen the situation in the round, ancll am reasonably 
sure that no hidden su~jt·ctive agenda, such as a desire for my own 
advantage, is driving the altitude. This is all that ol~ecth•ity is, or can 
be.2 
Expressivism is not tlw only position that t•mphasizes the neces-
sity of 'standing within', and allowing oursl'ln·s the resources of the 
rest of our network of nmms wlwn wt· work out rt·sponses to challenges 
directed at any one of them. Such a ~em-;uhian epistemology obviously 
appeals far more widely. I do howt'\'er hclien~ that t'xpressivism makes 
the real position uniqudy clear. This is because, by highlighting dis-
agreement in altitude (approml, prescription, choice) it alone makt·s 
it clear that we really arc talking about disabrwnnml. We arc aull about 
to find that our dini.·n~net~s vanish imo a kind of sogb')' appreciation 
of divergent responses, in the way that conct·ntration upon divergelll 
language-games, clh·ergen 1 ways oflife, or c\·cn divergent sccmtclaa)' qual-
ity ascriptions might cncourage. Thus, wlwn different groups of peo-
ple instance difl(·rcnt rt~sponsl'S, and wlwn attempts to 'get them to 
sec it our way' (;til, approaclws that highlight these things make it 
quixotic or mistakcn to st•e omscl\·es as rigltt and them as wroug. Wl· 
do not automatkally think thcrc is a right and wrong about the eat's 
way of smelling thc world, Vt'rsus mine, or the world of sound 
~ lllll.'n:stingly. tht· situation hell' i' 'luitt• doS<' It> tht• \my K:.mt pct~cl.'i\·l.'d it in thl.' 
case of the judgmt·lll of ht·;uuy in tlu· fir~! p;ut of thl.' Crilitf"" "f./~~tlt:""'"'· That judg-
llll"llt. thought Kant. dt·rin·d from ;nul •·xtn•·~sc.·d a tTnain at·stht·tic pleasure. But tht· 
judgment nen-rthdess ··;m ht· 'tlt·matuh·d' ftom otht·ts, and furms a suhjt•t·t of n>lll· 
munkation. 1lt-hate, ;uul t'\eu dispult'. This is ht•t·ilnse tht' pleasurt' is frt'e of 01ll con-
cerns ofthe self. It is ;1 disiutt•n·stt·d ilt·stht·tk tcspouse, arising of course inrt'spousc.· tu 
pt'rceplions of fitness ami harmouy. 
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available to the dog and that available to me. Here, the differences of 
response just encourage pluralism, and that of course is one of the main 
driving forces behind the notion that secondary qualities are 'in the 
mind'. In other contexts as well (notably those of style and fashion) 
we recognize that there are different groups, whose 'whirl of organ-
ism' has them pointing in different ways, and the thought indeed un-
dermines any peculiar attachnwnt to our way as the 'right' one.3 
Why does the expressivism actually help to gi\·e the thought that 
our way is right such force as it deserves in ethics? Well, the first step 
is to realize that to say that one opinion is right and another opinion 
is wrung is not donning a priestly mantle. It is not standing above the 
fray, but simply making a move within the language game of rejection 
and opposition. In the cases of secondary qualities and fashion, it is 
these attitudes or activities-r<:jection and opposition-that are threat-
ened by the naturalism, and rightly so. I do not reject or oppose the 
eat's way of smelling the world or the dog's way of hearing it. But in 
the case of ethics this is not so. If I h<n·c leamert to stand on my own 
feet, my rejection of the attiturle of (say) artmiration of the Holocaust 
is as implacable as can be. It can even march alongside illiberal-sound-
ing cousins: n:jection of the attiturle of toleration of the Holocaust, 
and n;jection of the attitude of those who would tolerate admiration 
or even tolerate toleration of it. In other words, it is because we arc in 
the domain of feeling and practice that we need feel no guilt in work-
ing out the imperatives of practical reasoning. We can also, as an aside, 
recognize the quite restricted domains of practical life where our 
stances arc inclcecl whimsical, and talk of subjectivity, of different ways 
of looking at it being equally 'good', and the other tired tropes of rel-
ativism gain some kind of foothold. 
Thomas Nagel talks of what he fears to be debunking naturalism, 
a corrosive imp on our shoulders that insists that, even at the end of 
· the day, when we have trumpeted what we can about truth, authority, 
reason, and the rest, it is 1ust us' :t He is the latest exponent of a long 
tradition of moral thought that revolt-; against expressivism. From Iris 
Murdoch, through writers such as Alasdair Macintyre, there is the 
same disapproving pursing nf the lips, a llllli mr tangere, as if the very 
idea is like a leper. How can the pure and mighty light of moral illu-
:l Fu1· llll the w;uer that lm~ flown under the bridge, I don'tthink the questions ha\"t" 
t•n•r het•n ;mswert·d that I raised in 'Rule-Following and Moral Realism', in Holtzman, 
S. and l.l'ich, S .. t•ds. 1\'illgrll.lll'ill: ·1;, F11tlmt• n ll11v. London: Routledge, 1981, esp. PI•· 
lil)-·1. 
·I Thomlls N;tgel, Tltl'l.tul \l',rd, N«"w Y<nk: Oxford l 1nh·C"rsity Press. 199i. 
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mination turn out to be nothing htll the 'bamu.·r of the questing will', 
the creation of our crooked tim her, a creature uf our scllish dl•sircs 
and jostlings h>r power, one o\'l'r till' otlll'r? And isn't this where we 
end up if the last word is that this is just us? 
Uut the last word is nc\·cr that 'this is just us'. For we can go on 
to describe the 'us' whom we arc. In the case of science we might say: 
that isjust us, informed, able to test dntgs rdiahly, inlll'ritors of a long 
and reasonably succcssfnltradition of increasing understanding and 
control of many natural phenomena. In thl· case of logil: we can say: 
that is jnst us, able to distinguish truth from f~1lsehood, able to dis-
tinguish beucr from worse inferences, able tn avoid what is necessarily 
not true. 
In the case of ethics, we have an even longer list of virtues. \Ve can 
say that indeed it is justus: liberal, humane, sympathetic, imaginative, 
able to admire auiludcs and pol icics useful and agn.·cablc to ourselves 
and others, capable of selecting what is bcller ami rl:jl·cting what is worse, 
able to bring other genders, ran~s. or even species within the folrls of 
our concern. These arc some of the last words of sdf~awarcness. I 
should say, and encourage others to say, that words such as thesl· arc 
the re\'Crse of embarrassing. They can ring lmppily in our cars, and 
make us proud, and be taken as complinwnts. And then the natural-
ism actually helps bolster our self~stc:em. We com he proud of the long 
cllurt to enable our lx-uer selves 10 triumph on•r our worse selves. Far 
fi"<nn debunking, naturalism bunks. 
It might be unkind, hut not inappropriaw to take a leafhl·re from 
John Stuart Mill's response to critirs who saw utilitarianism as a grubby 
fl·cklcs.'i doctJine, fit only f(>r people sunk in swinish pleasure. Mill replies 
that il is not utilitarianism, but the critics themselves who l)('liule and 
demean human nature, by thinking that this is the only kind of hap-
piness human beings can find. Similarly, I am inclined to think that it 
is the highest-llown, most dismissive theorists, those who pani<: at the 
very word expressivism, who similarly clenwan us. For them the ban-
ncr of the questing will is all that remains when some 'luasi-religious, 
external underpinning is rejected. In this, they cannot sec the immense 
complexity of human love and admiration, the compk·x sourn~s of pride 
and shame, or self~esteem and guilt. They sec us as apt to charge 
around unguided and wanton, unless we arc under the linn gm·e•·-
norship of God or reason or /(lg(ls, of whkh they arl· the guardians. I 
think they sell us short. 
II 
II 
The distaste for having us stand on our own feet rapidly becomes 
religious fervour. Here, the need for authority is answered by a voice 
outside us, the voice of God. \Ve only have to listen, and all is mack 
clear. The idea is ultimately relaxing: it gives us, as William .James said, 
a moral holiday. It substitutes responsiverws.o; for responsibility. 
Or mther, it appears to do so. For e\·entually it only defers the ques-
tion of responsibility. In normal human affairs, a testimony can he no 
more reliable than the status of the speaker. If the witness turns out 
not to have been at the scene, he is discn•clited, however comincing 
or sell~leccived he may be. People ar<' no good when they testify to 
what they cannot know. God's voice, of course, is not sul'!iect to that 
difiiculty. Butt hen to know that the \'Oice we !war is indeed God's voice 
becomes diflicult, and it is here that responsibility returns. In saying 
this, indclentally, I am saying something perfectly orthodox: I. John 
4.1 tells us to 'Try the spirits that they be~ of God, fclr there are many 
fitlsc prophets gone out into theworld'.ln clillerent places, God speaks 
in diffen•nt accents, and there is no process of tracing the different 
voices hack to the scene, as it were, and linding which was really then•. 
John un((u·nmatcly does not tell us how to liJ the spirits, m- in other 
words what to substimte for the mundane process of tracing the voices 
back to their source. The human response is to lmnk<'r down within 
a cultural tradition, but that has little except consermtism and tribal-
ism to recommend it. 
We all have to discard most purported Gods, and the only im-
partial path ofjustice is to discard all, ancl start again. There arc no 
moral holidays. For human beings, there is no escaping human re-
sponsibility. 
Bernard Williams once remarked that an atheist who thinks that, 
because of the death of God anything goes, is not really emancipated 
from theism. I think that is right, and the charge stands against post-
modernism. Here I should also like to add that taking naturalism as 
somehow ine\•itably debunking is a rathc·r specifically modem thing 
to do. Nobody acquainted \\ith the history of philosophy could think 
that the authors of naturalistic explanations always thought of them 
this way. Aristotle is usually hailed as a naturalist so, clearly, there is 
within the naturalistic tradition an ahcrnath•e view to postmodcmism. 
Hume, a card-carrying naturalist, said that 'those who have denied the 
reality of moral distinctions may he reckoned among the disingenu-
ous disputants' ,!i f-lume did not intend his approach to moral reasoning 
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to be in any way debunking 
Thl·rc art· further materials in the tradition to describe the atti-
tudes associated wilh ethil's. We arc social animals, const;mtly conscious 
of the potential voice of criticismlhun without. In Humc's wonderful 
and typically clown-to-earth example, 'a man will he monilil-d if you 
tell him he has a stinking breath, 'though 'tis evidently of no incon-
venience to hinlS(•Il'. When we U1' to ad1ieve a gt·neral pnim ofview, 
simply 'liking' soml·thing turns into 'endorsing' it. Here we enter the 
realm of vahlt.'S. We put forward a public daim, ancl as a n•sult need 
to be aware of our own potential f(H· exciting til(' hostility or praist.• of 
otlwrs, an:orcling to whether they concur with our t.•ndorsement. In 
our own minds, we should ha,·e a \'oice within reprc.•senting their ,·oice 
without, hut hoping for a ~common point of view" in whkh our en-
dorsement meets gt.·neral concu1-rence. The construction here touches 
on similar tlwmes to the contracta1·ian tradition in ethics, which sees 
us as aware of potential criticism on grounds ofil~justice, when we our-
selves could not al-cept the procedures we intend to I( list upon others. 
The common point of view stressed by Smith and Uunw, and perhaps 
more recently hy such writers as Rawls, Hahennas, or Snmlon, is one 
in which our desires as thought of as submim·cl to a kind of public dis-
course, whost.• verdict is then able to endorse tlll'm or rc.;ject them. 
m 
With these remark.'i in place, I would now like to conduclt.• hy suggesting 
a connection to liht·ralism. This may seem sacrilegious in a dificrent 
dimension. It is still impossible to talk ahout liberalism without walk-
ing in the shadow of.John Rawls, and if tlwre is one thing Rawls was 
not, it \\~ts a Humean naturalist. R•w:ls had little spnpathy with nwtacthics 
in general, none that I am aware of with anything deep in Jlume, and 
none at all with the idea of a quasi-realist construction of our right to 
talk of truth, knowledge, ur ol~ectivity when we are expressing our at-
titudes. C(•rtainly in the Tlwm)' ofjustire the Kant ian ism, and the sense 
of the tlwory ofjustil'c as a kind of second tier of authority, standing 
above and beyond any ml're conception of the good, arc till happy heel-
fellows with the packagt.· I have been defending. 
Howe\'l'r, these arejusttlw clements that om·nclt.·cl many critics, 
and l'specially comnmnitarians such as Taylor, Madntyre, Sandel, 
5 I hunt•, David. flltJIIitir.• (.imrt'ntinJ: lllllllflll t 1m/,·ntmulillg mul C:.muming tlt,./'rill.-i-
1'1"' t~{.\tm·lll•. t·tl. 1.. :\. St·IIJ)" Biggc. :\111 cdn. Rc,·i""d br 1'. II. Niddi1d1. Oxfurd: Osfurd 
lJni\'c•-•il)' l'rt'"-" Hli:,, p. 16!1. 
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and many more. They arc also the clt•mcnts that Rawls muted in his 
later work, where instead of liberalism emerging as a kind of tlworcm 
of rational contract, it became more likt• a pragmatic device leu· man-
aging a pluralistic democracy in which different competing concep-
tions of the good life needed to find an accnmmodation with each other. 
Well, there arc many different conceptions ofliberalism. A liberal, 
it is said, is someone who cannot take his own side in an argument. In 
other words, liberalism is identilicd with the postmodemist c\·en-hand-
cdness or rclati\ism, the equal 'respect' accorded to any old view. Ob-
viously, I have no truck with that: republican authority is real authority. 
Liberalism, it is also said, trades on the limtasy of dissociating the true 
self from its cultural identity, asking us to pay respect to artificially con-
structed situations of choice, in which we are stripped of everything 
that makes us what we are: our gender or class, our loyalties, allilia-
tions, social identities, and even our conception of what makes life worth 
thing. Perhaps that is a valid criticism of Rawls. But there is something 
close to Rawls of which it is not a valid criticism. This is the imperath·c 
towards linding a 'common point of\icw', or a language lor discussing 
policy that abstracts from an indivichml's own position. There are 
many ways, from Humc in the eighteenth century· to Scanlon in the 
prest•nt, of describing this imperative. Hume put it in terms of find-
ing a language common to all mankind, a language in which the ques-
tion becomes what we are to decide, about some policy or decision or 
character, rather than how it alfecto; me. A liberal society, we might say, 
is one in which the substantial conditions for such free discussion arc 
implemented to the fullest possible extent. Those substantial concli-
tions include, ob\iously enough. the rule of law, equality before the 
law, sufficient freedom of speech and inquiry, sufficient understand-
ing, ;mel therefore education,to as.o;imilate and respond to the reasons 
of others, and institutional checks on coercion and force, or what 
Philip Pettit calls domination. They provide the cultural background 
within which the free exchange of reasons is the motor that drives peo-
ples' minds. 
The contrast here is with authoritarianism. In an authoritarian so-
ciety the way you think is controlled by forces of which you may well 
he unaware, but which cannot be challenged by rational discourse. Ao; 
Onvell showed in 1984 the ideal mind control is one that is in\'isihlc 
to those who arc controlled hy it. It is easy to fear that other people 
arc in that condition: we might tend to suppose that institutions of brain-
washing, such as Islamic schools or madrassas, arc uniquely other pt•o-
ples' problem. I do not think that is true. A dominant culture docs not 
14 
haw to he politically \'isihle to act as a dark force on peoples' minds. 
A common example is the devaluation ofwomens' voices or minority 
vokes, and tht• role of narrati\'es such as pornobFJ·aphy in providing a 
climatt' in which that invisibly happens. 
1\ut we should not lt·ap from that caution to the posunodemist con-
clusion thattherd(Jre it is always coercion, or that the reign of ratio-
nal clisrourse is a fantasy. It is an ideal, and one to which we can furtlll'r 
and further approximate. That is why science is science, not the hege-
mony of a patriarchal power. What is true is that asymmetries of power, 
trailing hahits of unexamined culture and background, ha\'c to be 
wmclwd out l(n· and sometimes exorcised. But we know the liberal rem-
edy, since it has happt·ncd all around us. It lies in speech, and even-
tually speech that is heard and respected, taken on hoard as Wl' say. 
Once people know they ha\'c a blind spot, they know when to apply 
extra \'igilann\ A cl'iticalliheral education teaches us to be especially 
wary to proct·cd GUIIiously, when we are especially enamoured of a sin-
glt~ point of view. 1\ut it docs not tell us always to retreat. 
I do not want to go fi.trthcr into practical politics, nor into pessimism 
about tht• survival of liberal values into a cellllll1' which shows every 
sign of domination hy coercion and blind conviction, nor the polari-
sation of people who refuse to think in tenus of we and us, and think 
only of me and mine, where that includes my tribe, my faith, my cui-
tun~. Equally, although I am also pessimistic about this, I do not want 
to dwdl on the threat fi·om private ownership of the channels of mass 
t·ommuniration that we sec all around us. The cognitive incapacities 
of many human bcings-tlwir domination by untrue and unlikely be-
licls, destructive and sdl~lestnu:tivc emotions, misleading paradigms 
and lwuristics, is another melancholy topic. As many critics have 
chtinwd, til(' 'ideal speech situation' of pure transparent shared ra-
tionality, ccll'lmned by.Jurgcn Habermasii, may be a rare bird inclcccl. 
What) clo want to say is that we h;we to keep the ideals of lilwral-
ism alive and well, and that they deserve our loyalty. And I want to say 
that no postmodern irony, no sogb')' pluralism or communitarianism, 
provides any similar \'ision. Finally, I want to associate a republican tm-
derst<mding of the sources of value with a political implementation of 
these idt•als. \Vht•n we create our own authmity, we arc forced to rec-
ognize our own responsibility, and we know that we have to monitor 
it to keep it civilized. When we h;mker afte•· external authority and <·nd 
up beli<•ving we have found it, we listen only to \'oices fi·om without, 
and then we cannot monitor ourscl\·es properly, and we risk sinking 
b;Kk into barbarism. It is as simple as that. 
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